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No one will question the importance of doing effective business planning.
And yet, even including our own research, little objective analysis has been
done on business planning in high-technology enterprises. This paper presents
some findings from our examination of a series of twenty business plans sub-
mitted by startup high-technology companies to venture capital firms in the
Boston area.* This is one of our many studies of various aspects of high-
technology new enterprises which have been underway since 1964..
The Typical Firm
Of the twenty plans that we examined, ten of the companies had no prior
operations, trying to raise money as part of putting their act together.
Six of the companies had done RD only and had generated no sales at the
time of submitting the plan for financing. Three of the-companies had
*My sincere appreciation is expressed to Robert Sutherland who carried out
the data analysis as part of his Sloan School Master's thesis.
Ill
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completed their product development phase, but had only nominal sales, less
than $25,000 in each case. Only one company had what might be considered
moderate sales. That company had been in business for a couple of years and
was doing less than $200,000 in annual sales.
The composite team in these companies consisted of four members. That
is good; our early studies of new enterprise performance have indicated that
to a great extent, the more co-founders the merrier.(l) One phenomenon to be
wary of is the "one man" entrepreneurial setting. Although the solo founder
company may succeed, it does so against powerful odds. Within a reasonable
range, the more people and skills dimensions that you add to the initial team,
the higher the statistical likelihood that you will be successful. That doesn't
mean you should go out and do a random recruiting act.
In the earlier studies, we found one company that we classified as having
one hundred co-founders. MIT had decided to spin-off an entire small laboratory
as a single entity. The whole group became a for-profit corporation. As we had
no basis for classifying who was a founder, we counted them all!
The age range of the composite team in our business planning study was 30
to 40 years of age, with a median of 37 years of age. That is rather old, certainly
older than our earlier samples of MIT spinoff companies and other high-technology
new firms. Those data on close to four hundred high-technology companies demon-
strate that if you haven't formed your first company by the age of forty, it is
almost a certainty that you will not form a company. I say that despite the fact
that our studies did include a few MIT professors who, upon retirement at age 65,
found that they still had boundless energy and started companies.
A wide range of college education is represented in the teams that we
saw. The only comment I would add about educational backgrounds is that our
broader studies indicated that if the dominant entrepreneur was a Ph.D., the
firm had a low likelihood of success. I admit this reluctantly, given my
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own degrees. Not only does the Ph.D. process drain quite a bit out of you,
but Ph.D.-based companies have a high tendency to be research-oriented companies
as opposed to technology and product-oriented companies. Ph.D.-based companies
tend to be consulting firms, or they carry out government contracting and studies,
sometimes doing important analytical work for industry. In terms of business
success measured in sales and profitability, however, these kinds of companies
tend to be not successful.
That composite of four co-founders typically included two who had RD or
design backgrounds. This is not unreasonable given the base of high-technology
firms on which we were focusing. One founder usually had marketing or sales
experience. That is a very positive attribute of these startup firms. Our
general studies have indicated that having someone initially in the business
unit who is explicitly oriented to sales or marketing significantly improves
the co~pany's tendency to succeed. The remaining person in the team sometimes
had production experience; in other cases he came from accounting, finance,
or a background in handling general administrative responsibilities. This
is another factor that needs to be taken into account. Our earlier broader
studies indicated that the presence of some formal administrative role (e.g.,
finance or business administration) was also a useful component of the start-
up firm and correlated positively with success of the company.
The Start-Up Plan
We were forced to maintain proprietary relationships with the venture
capital companies that allowed us access to the plans, so we couldn't go
directly to the entrepreneurs. Plan assessment; was carried out by a careful
and systematic diagnosis of the plan documents themselves.
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Plan Perspectives
Our first observation, gratefully, was that all twenty plans had some
kind of a stated overall objective. You could clearly understand what the
companies were trying to do broadly. Only fourteen of the twenty, however,
had a specific strategy, formulated and explained, that appeared rational and
achievable, before you looked at a detailed evaluation of whether it was
really rational and achievable. In our first step toward details, we in a
sense lost one-third of the companies. After stating their objectives
broadly, six of the companies didn't even provide clear understanding of the
overall approach that they were going to use to achieve those objectives; the
documents contained only an implied strategy. This deficiency is certainly
a detriment to raising funds. It is difficult enough for a venture capitalist
to believe in the objectives of the new company; if the plans don't give the
venture capitalist the benefit of seeing details on how the firm is going to
achieve its objectives, the company won't have much chance for funding success.
As shown in Table 1 we classified the central thrust or orientation of
the plan into three different emphases. 47 percent of the plans had as a
central thrust the product itself. While product emphasis can be a good
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feature for a plan, sometimes that comes across as technology push. You
propose that you can do it better than anybody else. However, have you
demonstrated that anyone wants it? Have you so focused on the beauty of
product that you forgot to worry about its attractiveness from a market's
perspective as well as on the ability of your group to carry out company
development and implementation.
29 percent of the plans we analyzed focused on the market. Many of
those plans,however, only addressed how attractive and growing was the market.
Those plans didn't persuade the reader that the start-up group had a clear
competitive advantage in that marketplace, or why the new company was
going to be able to develop a particular share of that marketplace.
24 percent of the plans focused on the people who were the entrepre-
neurial team. Despite all the talk by venture capitalists and successful
entrepreneurs about people being the most important ingredient for company
success, when people are the primary ingredient in the plan serious questions
are raised. If you say, "We have assembled a superb team" and, by implication,
"Don't worry about our product and our market, because we have the flexibility
to shift", you will not instill confidence. The team do not appear to have
yet committed themselves to the specifics of targeted activities and partici-
pation in the marketplace.
What you really need in a new business plan is a central thrust, whatever




Let me indicate some of the deficiencies we uncovered in the details
provided to support the strategy. 45 percent of the plans that we reviewed
lacked emphasis on economic performance. The plans didn't talk about profit-
ability and growth in a significant enough fashion. Profits often appeared
to be either implicit or just happened to be included in the numbers. Profits
frequently did not seem to be the focus of the founders' discussion of the
company they were trying to build. The venture capitalist wants at least the
supported promises that the company will make a profit'!
In over half of the cases, the plans lacked adequate analysis of the
economic environment--the business climate and the extent of competition in
the marketplace. And yet only 30 percent had inadequate analysis of the tech-
nical environment. In general the plans contain strong coverage of technical
dimensions, and I might say overly strong. The plans reflect what the entre-
preneurs understand best but they also reflect what they don't understand.
Plans frequently described the general technology, where it was going and who
was doing what within the technology, with much less attention to non-technical
aspects of the business environs.
In terms of the specifics of competition, in most business plans--in this
case three-quarters--it is almost an impossibility to identify that there is
anybody who competes with the proposed company. To identify a specific com-
peting firm, you really have to search hard. You can read one business plan
after another, and be absolutely certain that three out of four new companies
come to full fruition out of the head of Zeus, in a brand new marketplace that
nobody has ever been in. This may be wishful thinking, but is usually incorrect
and dangerous planning.
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Finally, in terms of a broad-based deficiency, almost half of the company
plans suggested that they were trying to do too much broadly or too many differ-
ent things at once. Plans often enumerated multiple product lines at the outset.
They listed large numbers of markets that the company would instantly attempt to
enter and conquer, without really communicating a rational allocation of re-
sources or priorities so as to demonstrate focus.
Functional Planning Deficiencies
In terms of the specific functional areas, we looked at and divided our
analysis into four clusters--the marketing plan, the management team, the R&D
Table 2
Inadequate Functional Plan in Critical Area
% of Plans Reviewed
Marketing plan 70
Management team 65
Research and development plan 45
Financial plan 60
plan and the financial plan. In terms of our assessment, very carefully drawn,
we found that the marketing plans were inadequate in 70 percent of the cases.
The management team had deficiencies in 65 percent of the cases. The RD plan
was deficient in only 45 percent of the cases. The financial plan had major
deficiencies in 60 percent of the cases.
Let's look at marketing first. In only 40 percent of the cases had the
company formulated a specific marketing strategy, stated or implied. In 60
percent of the cases, they hadn't.
In 50 percent of the cases, you could understand from the plan that the
company was targeting a very specific market segment or specialized niche.
That at least provided an understanding of how to assess marketing, because
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it wasn't just a product for everybody; it had a particular orientation. The
reader (or venture capitalist) could then worry about whether or not that
target was a real market.
In 30 percent of the cases, the company had developed a detailed sales
(not marketing) plan, and had stated what those details were--how many sales-
people--why, where, and when--means of compensation, and the like. In 20
percent of the cases, a broad sales plan was implied but not specifically
detailed. You had to read between the lines to come up with the details.
50 percent of the cases did not contain any sales plan. The entrepreneur may
well have said, "Sales are going to be realized because we are going to have
a good product aimed at a great market." That's fine, but how specifically
is the firm going to get customers to give you orders? This needs inclusion
as well.
In general, this type of deficiency tends to reflect a lack of appre-
ciation of the selling function by people who form companies based largely on
beliefs in the technological advantages that can be provided to a market. One
company I remember from our earlier studies was co-founded by five MIT graduates.
They rotated, for several years, the position of vice president of sales. They
did that because no one wanted that function. The company got off the ground
and got to an early low threshold and stayed there for about eight years. Then,
they totally reorganized, the company brought in an experienced sales vice
president, and grew substantially.
In terms of market research, in 70 percent of the plans only broad brush
market research seemed to be evident. In 25 percent of the cases, at least one




Approach to establish existence of market "broad brush" 70
Personal sales experience of team member 25
Detailed customer survey 25
Plan indicates detailed knowledge of potential customer 45
market and could relate to the market personally. That has some real credibil-
ity in the plan. 25 percent of the plans described results of a detailed
customer survey that was evident as a representation of what was going on in
the targeted market. In 45 percent of the cases, the plan somehow succeeded
in indicating a detailed knowledge of the potential customer and what was
important to that customer.
I must say that you don't always have to demonstrate market research to
have a successful business plan. Several years ago, I interviewed the founder
of a company that had started in the business of high-speed transistorized
electronic modules for use in the assembly of digital systems. I asked him
how he had known that his product would sell. The entrepreneur responded, "I
was a project engineer at MIT working on digital systems. I knew I would have
used those circuit modules if they were available." I asked, "Did you talk to
other people?" He said, "I knew there were hundreds of guys just like me who
would have been delighted to have had such a product." I am not about to dis-
parage that founder, Ken Olsen, or the accomplishments of Digital Equipment
Corporation, despite the absence of clear market research at the initiation of
DEC!
Indeed, I might add the reinforcement that our earlier studies of high-technolo
companies had uncovered a negative correlation between whether you carried out
 _ I ___
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formal market research and whether you succeeded as a company. Our hypothesis
was that if you could carry out market research, you were already too late to
build a new business in that area. Despite the anecdote and our statistics,
venture capitalists do gain confidence from a plan that suggests that you know
something about the customer and market to which you are trying to sell.
Our next area of analysis was the skills composition of the management
team. I strongly emphasize that venture capitalists are very concerned with
the ensemble of critical capabilities. In three of the twenty business plans
we reviewed, someone else was needed on the research and product development
side of the group. In 40 percent of the cases, marketing was absent from the
team. 35 percent of the teams had a marked deficiency in operations, in cases
where operational skills seemed to matter. We are not talking about a software
organization where the factory consists of desks and people sitting in front of
them. We are referring to cases where the company was proposing an activity that
needed a manufacturing capability but yet had no manufacturing skills among the
founders. Any of these omitted critical roles can doom not only the business
plan but, more importantly, the business itself.





Some characteristics of uniqueness 40
Not unique 15
100
be unique. Our broader earlier studies determined that one of the strongest
correlates of new company success was the movement rapidly to the market of an
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advanced technology drawn from major MIT laboratories or academic departments
or from other advanced RD organizations. A start-up company doesn't have a
lot going for it. The most likely possible advantage is that your technology
is far better than anything else that is available in the market. The company
may be small and under-resourced, but it might have a technical edge on the
competition. If as an entrepreneur you can't honestly find something unique
about your technology, you had better be strong in indicating in your business
plan why your start-up enterprise has the capacity to overtake much larger
companies.
40 percent of the plans asserted some characteristics of technological
uniqueness, and 15 percent of the companies claimed no unique technology at
all. These latter companies have the burden to prove that success is attainable
without unique technology.
One further aspect of the technology is the extent to which it is pro-
tected. Only 45 percent of the plans even discussed the protection of technology.
25 percent of the companies had taken steps to patent their technology, and in
10 percent of the cases the technology could not be patented or the patent
had expired. I don't want to overstate the importance of patenting. It isn't
vital in most high-technology firms; it is critical in some. However, the
notion of discussing technology protection in the plan is important. The key
is whether the unique qualities of the company can be maintained, not whether
the product can be patented.
Let me turn finally to financial aspects of the plan. In 10 percent of
the cases, no financial statements were included. This is inexcusable. You
shouldn't expect people to deal with you financially and invest money in your




Projected Financial Statements Included
None 10
Data not available 5
One to three year income statement only 10
Four or five year income statement only 40
One to three year income statement and balance sheet 15
Four or five year income statement and balance sheet 10
100
communicates expected financial outcomes. 5 percent of the plans included
bare outlines of financial statements but the specifics weren't included,
saying that the data were not available. Some plans promised that more
financial information would be provided in a later submission.
In 10 percent of the cases, a one to three year income statement was
available. Any prospective entrepreneur who doesn't know what an income state-
ment is, had better learn fast! 40 percent of the plans contained four or five
year income statements only. In one case out of four, both multi-year income
statements and balance sheets were included.
10 percent of the proposals provided financial plans based on multiple
sets of assumptions. In these days of VisiCalc, an entrepreneurial team can
roll out as many variations on a financial theme as anyone could ask for. You
almost have to hold back. You can alter market penetration assumptions, startup
costs, or competitive responses and generate alternative financials based upon
whatever you want to put forward.
Only 20 percent of the cases, in our judgment, included adequate support-
ing detail for the financial plans. The other 80 percent, even when there was
a financial plan, lacked the supporting detail to back it up.
_ 1 _ _ _-_ _ _ __ - ---- __ _ g s__x e ____H  _  _: e_ e _ _ _ 
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One anecdote merits repeating on the issue of including an income state-
ment and balance sheet in initial plans. Ken Olsen commented that he and
Harlan Anderson approached American Research and Development Company (AR&D) with
their proposal to get funding for Digital Equipment. They were told that while
the project was interesting, they needed financials in their plan. But as
two engineers from MIT's Lincoln Lab the entrepreneurs didn't know much about
how to create financial plans. Then Olsen remembered that he had taken first-
semester economics at MIT, and that he still had his copy of the 1951 edition
of Samuelson's classic book. In his section on accounting, Samuelson tells
you how to put together an income statement and a balance sheet. The'example
is Pepto Glitter Inc. Olsen said they really didn't know what ARiD wanted,
but they copied out all the entries for Pepto Glitter Inc., changed the name,
and plugged in a few different numbers. AR&D told him later that it was one
of the most sophisticated business plans they had ever seen! The $70,000 that
AR&D invested for 70 percent of Digital Equipment turned out to be worth
billions.
Venture Capital Funding
At the start-up of the firm, sophisticated financial plans say less about
whether you will be successful ultimately and more about whether you will be
successful initially. Initially, success will constitute getting money from
that venture capitalist!
The data of Table 6 indicate the relationship between the adequacy of
these business plans and whether or not the companies received venture capital
financing. When the overall plan was assessed by us as having had minor








Relationships Between Deficiencies in Plans
and Success in Obtaining Financing
(Number of Plans and Percentage
of Plans Reviewed)
Enterprise Not Financed
Financed by a by a Venture
Assessment Venture Capitalist or
Capitalist Data Unavailable
eficiencies 4 (20%) 1 ( 5%)
Deficiencies 4 (20%) 3 (15%)
:ant Deficiencies 2 (10%) 6 (30%)
,an _ ef _ 2_1
10 (50%) 10 (50%)
deficiencies overall, four out of five were financed by venture capitalists. One
of the plans was not initially financed by a venture capitalist. Perhaps it was
done considerably later, however. When we found moderate deficiencies in the
business plan, four out of seven of those plans were financed by a venture
capitalist. If, in our evaluation of those plans, the plan contained significant
deficiencies, only two out of eight got funded.
One critical aspect of the business plan is that if you don't do it
right, there is a high likelihood that you will never do anything beyond it.
Business planning needs to be undertaken seriously if for no other reason than
it is a major tangible representation of who you are, what you are and what








(1) Reference in the paper to our earlier studies include an entire body
of investigations on new enterprises, entrepreneurs, venture capital,
etc. Two citations of possible interest are:
a. Roberts, E.B., "Entrepreneurship and Technology", esearch
Management, July 1968 (vol. 11, no. 4), 249-266;
b. Roberts, E.B. and Wainer, H., "Some Characteristics of Technical
Entrepreneurs" IEEE Transactions on Engineering Management,
August 1971 (vol. EM-18, no. 3), 100-109.
